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1 Introduction
In recent years, a renewed interest in decision rules based on imitation has emerged,
partially motivated by the literature on evolutionary game theory. Bj¨ ornerstedt and
Weibull (1996) show that if a game is recurrently played by a continuum population
of individuals who mimic the actions of better performing individuals observed at
random, population play follows the solution trajectories of the replicator dynamics;
imitation is thus one of the possible decision rules underlying the most prominent
evolutionary dynamics. It is well known that Nash equilibria are rest points of the
replicator dynamics. Moreover, evolutionarily stable strategies (henceforth ESS) as
deﬁned by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) for a continuum population are always
Nash equilibrium strategies and asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics.
Further, if a state is the limit of a trajectory starting in the interior of the state space,
then this limit is necessarily a symmetric Nash equilibrium. In summary, if individu-
als in a large population mimic successful behavior, when population play converges,
it does so to a Nash equilibrium. Hence, evolutionary game theory provides a non
rationalistic foundation to equilibrium play (see Weibull, 1995, chap. 2 and 3).
The relation between ESS, Nash equilibrium, and the long-run outcomes of imi-
tative dynamics in ﬁnite-population models is not so well understood. This relation
constitutes the main interest of the present paper. In particular, we identify classes
of games where a ﬁnite-population ESS is always a Nash equilibrium strategy.
The concept of ﬁnite-population ESS as deﬁned by Schaﬀer (1988) is not re-
lated to Nash equilibrium in general (cf. Section 3).1 Stochastic models of evo-
lutionary learning in games that postulate individual behavior driven by imitation
also yield somewhat contradictory outcomes. A prominent example is provided by
Vega-Redondo (1997), who shows that imitation of successful strategies leads to
competitive equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly. Al´ os-Ferrer et al. (2000), however,
show that imitative behavior does lead to Nash equilibrium in a Bertrand oligopoly.
The latter holds also in the case of convex costs where there is a large set of Nash
1Schaﬀer (1989) shows, for example, that Nash equilibrium and ESS diﬀer in a Cournot duopoly
and Hehenkamp et al. (2004) show this for rent-seeking games. Tanaka (1999; 2000) has similar
results for oligopolies with asymmetric cost functions and diﬀerentiated product respectively.
1equilibria beyond the competitive equilibrium (see Dastidar (1995)).2 These results
show that, in ﬁnite-population models, imitative behavior may or may not lead to
Nash equilibrium, depending on the type of game. The present paper takes a fur-
ther step in trying to understand how the properties of imitative rules are related
to evolutionary stability of Nash equilibrium in ﬁnite-population models.
The results obtained so far point rather to a more general relation between evolu-
tionary stability, the long-run outcomes of imitative behavior, and perfectly compet-
itive (instead of Nash) equilibrium. In a recent paper, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005)
study this relation for a class of games that includes the Cournot oligopoly. Their fo-
cus is on aggregative games, where payoﬀs to any player depend on own strategy and
an aggregate of all players’ strategies. For an aggregative game, aggregate-taking
behavior can be deﬁned as payoﬀ maximization disregarding the own eﬀect on the
aggregate, which is the analogue to perfectly competitive behavior. It is shown that,
if the game displays strategic substitutability between own strategy and the aggre-
gate, aggregate-taking behavior has strong evolutionary stability properties. These
properties, in turn, imply that aggregate-taking behavior is the long-run outcome of
a stochastic learning process where individual decisions are based on imitation of suc-
cessful strategies and random experimentation. Strategic substitutability between
own strategy and the aggregate creates a tension between high relative performance,
the dominating force behind evolutionary stability, and high absolute performance,
which drives Nash equilibrium; as a consequence, imitation leads away from Nash
equilibrium.
In contrast, our main focus here will be on games where imitation is improving;
i. e. where mimicking successful strategies always results in a payoﬀ improvement
to the imitator. In such games the conﬂict between absolute and relative payoﬀ
maximization is weakened and we can show that a ﬁnite-population ESS always
corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Before that, we deﬁne imitative
behavior formally and review the concept of ﬁnite-population ESS. We will argue
that as a consequence of ﬁnite-population eﬀects, the coincidence of ESS and Nash
equilibrium constitutes the exception rather than the rule. That said, we proceed
to show that ESS and Nash equilibrium do coincide in constant-sum games and in
games with weak payoﬀ externalities, where any deviation always aﬀects the de-
viator’s payoﬀ more than the opponents’ payoﬀs. We then turn to games where
2Note that the results for Cournot and Bertrand competition are compatible only in the partic-
ular case of homogeneous product and constant unit costs, where ﬁrms competing ` a la Bertrand
always price competitively in equilibrium. For the case of increasing marginal costs, it is shown
that imitative behavior leads to a subset of the set of Nash equilibria. That subset includes the
competitive equilibrium only in certain cases.
2imitation is improving and establish a link between the static equilibrium concepts
and the properties of imitative dynamics. Finally, we give an example of a game
in the latter class, namely a Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product and de-
creasing returns to scale. We show that mimicking the price of the best performing
ﬁrm in the industry always increases the proﬁts of the imitating ﬁrm. This implies
that evolutionarily stable prices correspond to Nash equilibrium prices. In the con-
text of this example, we also show that not all Nash equilibria are evolutionarily
stable; evolutionary stability actually selects a subset of the equilibrium prices char-
acterized by Dastidar (1995). Our results for the example also clarify some of the
dynamic results obtained in Al´ os-Ferrer et al. (2000). The fact that ESS corresponds
to Nash equilibrium only exceptionally, makes it even more remarkable that this is
the case for price competition.
The results obtained here for Bertrand oligopoly are related to those in Qin and
Stuart (1997) and Hehenkamp and Leininger (1999), who study evolutionary stabil-
ity of Bertrand equilibrium in a market with constant unit costs and a continuum
population. Whereas the former show that the Nash equilibrium where all ﬁrms
price at marginal cost is not evolutionarily stable, the latter argue that, if the set of
prices that ﬁrms are allowed to charge is discrete, then a new equilibrium appears
where all ﬁrms set the smallest price above marginal cost, and this equilibrium is
indeed evolutionarily stable. In the analysis, they use the notion of evolutionary
stability for a continuum population — which corresponds in that case to a con-
tinuum of ﬁrms that are randomly matched in a continuum of n-ﬁrm independent
Bertrand markets. This framework, traditionally used for evolutionary analysis, is
diﬃcult to reconcile with the interpretation of an oligopolistic market as a game
with a small number of players. Partly, our contribution is to show that the ﬁnite-
population deﬁnition of evolutionary stability is better suited for the analysis of
evolutionary aspects in markets. For the case of constant unit costs, our results
imply evolutionary stability of the Nash equilibrium.
The type of improving property exploited in the present paper is related to the
optimality properties of imitative rules deﬁned by Schlag (1998) for the case of
multi-arm bandit problems; i. e. problems of individual decision making under un-
certainty. There, it is shown that individuals in a large population can learn the best
strategy by following certain forms of sophisticated imitation. Conlisk (1980) and,
more recently, Rhode and Stegeman (2001) and Schipper (2002) provide dynamic
models with two types of decision-makers, optimizers and imitators, in a stable en-
vironment. In diﬀerent contexts, they show that imitators survive and perform at
least as well as optimizers in the long run. The idea that absolute payoﬀ maximizers
3do not necessarily obtain higher payoﬀs in equilibrium than individuals with other
objectives was also proposed by Fershtman and Judd (1987) and, more recently,
Ko¸ ckesen et al. (2000) show that strategic decision makers that maximize relative
instead of absolute payoﬀs may have an absolute-payoﬀ advantage in equilibrium in
a large class of interesting economic games that satisfy structural conditions related
to super- or submodularity, payoﬀ monotonicity, and payoﬀ externalities.
Imitative behavior has often been justiﬁed not on the grounds of optimality in
decision making, but because it saves decision-making costs. Pingle and Day (1996)
report on a number of experimental settings where decision costs have been explicitly
incorporated. They ﬁnd that subjects use imitation along with other modes of
economizing behavior in order to avoid those costs. Finally, Huck et al. (1999) and
Apesteguia et al. (2003) provide theoretical and experimental support showing that
the use and dynamic properties of imitative behavioral rules depend crucially on
the informational setting in which they take place. Our work is complementary to
theirs, showing that even under the same informational assumptions, imitative rules
have diﬀerent properties depending on the game where they are used. Moreover, our
emphasis is on the fact that the dynamic properties of imitation are directly related
to the properties of the static concept of ﬁnite-population evolutionary stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we make a formal
description of imitative and improving rules. In Section 3 we review the concept of
ﬁnite-population ESS and establish the relation to Nash equilibrium in particular
classes of games. In Section 4 we turn to Bertrand oligopoly and show that price
imitation is always improving, which allows to calculate the set of evolutionarily
stable prices easily; at the end of the section we also explore the eﬀects of imitative
behavior on industry proﬁts. In Section 5 we make some concluding remarks.
2 Simple behavioral rules for games
In the present section we give a deﬁnition of imitative behavior. A basic premise
will be that behavior is adaptively driven by observation of past actions and the
performance associated to those actions.3 As will become apparent later on, behavior
based on imitation requires symmetry to a certain extent; for example, imitation is
only possible if the same set of actions is available to all decision makers. Therefore
our focus will be on symmetric games and on symmetric behavioral rules.
3Our formal description of behavioral and, in particular, imitative rules will be akin to those in
Apesteguia et al. (2003), Josephson and Matros (2004), and Selten and Ostmann (2001).
42.1 Better reply correspondence
Consider a normal-form game Γ with set of players I = {1,...,n}, set of strategies S,
common to all players, and payoﬀs to player i ∈ I given by the function πi : Sn → R.
The game is symmetric if there exists a function π : S × Sn−1 → R such that, for
any strategy proﬁle s = (s1,...,sn), πi(s) = π(si|s−i) = π(si|s′
−i) where si is player
i’s strategy in the proﬁle s, s−i is the vector of all players’ strategies except i in the
proﬁle s, and s′
−i is any permutation of s−i. I. e. the game is symmetric if payoﬀs to
any strategy are independent of the players’ names and invariant to permutations
of the opponents’ strategies.
Denote (s′
i,s−i) the strategy proﬁle where all players but i choose strategies
according to a given proﬁle s and player i chooses s′
i ∈ S. Given s, the better reply
set of player i is given by
Bi(s) = {s
′
i ∈ S | πi(s
′
i,s−i) ≥ πi(s)}. (1)
The set Bi(s) contains the strategies that would weakly improve i’s payoﬀ at s.
Obviously, si ∈ Bi(s) for all s. This concept was introduced by Ritzberger and
Weibull (1995).
2.2 Imitative and improving rules
Let us now consider any decision problem where the individuals in I = {1,...,n}
have to choose strategies from the set S, knowing the sets I and S, and knowing
that their payoﬀs depend on the strategies chosen by others in I. Suppose, however,
that they do not have precise information about the payoﬀ function and are thus
not able to calculate best responses. Instead, they decide on the basis of observed
past performance. Since they do not behave strategically, we do not refer to them
as players, but rather as individuals or decision makers. We now deﬁne what we
mean by an imitative behavioral rule in this context.
A behavioral rule for decision maker i, denoted Fi : Xi ։ S, is a correspondence
mapping i’s set of possible observations Xi into the set of strategies S. Given
that individual i observes xi ∈ Xi, Fi(xi) ⊆ S is the set of strategies that i may
take next period. A system of behavioral rules F = (F1,...,Fn) is symmetric if
X = X1 = ... = Xn and if F1(x) = ... = Fn(x) for all x ∈ X; i. e. if all decision
makers have the same set of possible observations, and if the individual behavioral
rules prescribe the same to all of them, provided that they observed the same. For
the purpose of this paper it will be enough to focus on symmetric systems where all
decision makers use the same behavioral rule F.
5Let C(s) be the set of strategies currently chosen at any proﬁle s. Formally,
C(s) = {s ∈ S | s = si, for some i ∈ I}. (2)
A behavioral rule F : X ։ S is imitative if X = Sn × Rn and F(x) ⊆ C(s)
for all x = (s,u) ∈ X where u = (u1,...,un) is an arbitrary vector of observed
payoﬀs.4 Note the two parts of the deﬁnition. First, current strategies chosen and
payoﬀs to all individuals constitute the set of possible observations. Second, the
rule prescribes to choose strategies that are observed in the current proﬁle only. We
explicitly introduce the ﬁrst requirement because imitation is possible only if other
strategies are observed. Observability of payoﬀs is not necessary in general for the
deﬁnition of an imitative rule. Rules like ‘imitate the most popular strategy’ do
not require that payoﬀs are observed. It is more likely, however, that imitation is
based on some measure of success associated to each strategy and that this success
is related to payoﬀs obtained and not only to popularity.5
Given x = (s,u), let the reference set at x be given by
R(x) = {s ∈ S | s = si for some i ∈ I and ui ≥ uj for all j ∈ I}. (3)
The reference set R(x) ⊆ C(s) contains the strategies chosen at s that gave highest
observed payoﬀs. We say that a behavioral rule F corresponds to imitate the best if
F(x) = R(x) for all x ∈ X; i. e. if the strategies that may be chosen by any decision
maker next period are those that gave highest payoﬀs in the current proﬁle.
Finally, suppose that the underlying decision problem can be modelled through
the game Γ, although individuals do not know the payoﬀ functions and follow some
simple behavioral rule F. Given s ∈ Sn, denote π(s) = (π1(s),...,πn(s)) the
associated vector of payoﬀs. We say that a behavioral rule F is improving in Γ
if for all x(s) = (s,π(s)), F(x(s)) ⊆ Bi(s) for all s ∈ Sn and all i ∈ I. I. e. starting
at any s with associated observed payoﬀs given by u = π(s) according to Γ, following
F will result in a weak payoﬀ improvement to any decision maker.
4We use the notation π for payoﬀs resulting from the game Γ and u for arbitrary vectors of
observed payoﬀs. Recall that decision makers cannot infer payoﬀs when they observe strategies.
5A more general deﬁnition of an imitative rule could allow the elements of X to be arbitrary
sets instead of vectors, provided that each element of X intersects S × R; i. e. imitation is only
possible if at least some strategy and payoﬀ are observed. It is not necessary that individuals
observe all strategies currently used and their associated payoﬀs. Alternatively, they could observe
the current strategies and payoﬀs of some randomly chosen sample of individuals, or they could
also have information about past behavior. This would require a richer structure for the set X
that we avoid here.
63 Evolutionary stability in ﬁnite populations
In the present section we establish a relation between improving imitative rules and
the concept of evolutionary stability. It is customary in evolutionary game theory
to consider an inﬁnite population of individuals who are randomly matched to play
some given game recurrently. In that context, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if,
once adopted by all individuals in the population, it cannot be outperformed by any
other mutant strategy coming in the population in a suﬃciently small fraction. The
notion of evolutionary stability is based on relative performance; that is, on payoﬀ
comparisons between the status quo and the mutant strategy in the post-entry
population proﬁle. It is well known that in the context of an inﬁnite population an
evolutionarily stable strategy always constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium (see
Weibull, 1995, chap. 2). In the same spirit, Schaﬀer (1988) proposed a deﬁnition of
evolutionary stability for n-player games played within a ﬁnite population, which
seems more suitable for application to economic problems. In this context, however,
due to ﬁnite-population eﬀects, a strategy may be successful in relative terms even
if it is not a Nash equilibrium strategy (see Vega-Redondo, 1996, sec. 2.7).
Consider the symmetric game Γ. The set of players I is the ﬁnite population
of individuals choosing strategies from S. Payoﬀs to individual i ∈ I at the proﬁle
s = (si,s−i) are given by πi(s) = π(si|s−i).
We say that s ∈ S is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if for all s′ ∈ S,
π(s|s
′,s, n−2 ...,s) ≥ π(s
′|s,s, n−1 ...,s). (4)
An ESS is strict if the last inequality holds strictly for all s′  = s. That is, once
adopted by all individuals in the population, an ESS cannot be outperformed by any
alternative strategy after any single deviation. Note that, in a population where all
but one deviant choose s, the single deviant choosing s′ faces the opponents’ proﬁle
(s,s, n−1 ...,s) while those still choosing s face the proﬁle (s′,s, n−2 ...,s); the deviant
never confronts another deviant as in the standard deﬁnition of ESS for an inﬁnite
population where a small positive mass of mutants enters the population.
The focus of evolutionary stability is not on the usual comparison of payoﬀs to s
and s′ before and after deviation as in a Nash equilibrium, but on the comparison of
simultaneous payoﬀs to s and s′ in the resulting proﬁle after deviation. An ESS has
a relative, not necessarily an absolute, advantage. If an ESS, s, has been adopted
by all individuals in the population, it may be proﬁtable for an individual to deviate
to some s′, but that deviation would result in an even larger increase in the payoﬀs
of s, which has ex-post a relative advantage.
An ESS can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium strategy of a transformed game,
7where the players’ objective is to maximize relative instead of absolute payoﬀs.




′|s,s, n−1 ...,s) − π(s|s
′,s, n−2 ...,s). (5)
Instead, a strategy played in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the original game
(with payoﬀ function π) would only maximize the ﬁrst part of the objective function
in problem (5). Therefore, it is not surprising that the equivalence of ESS and Nash
equilibrium strategies is more the exception than the rule.
On the other hand, the concept of ESS is related to another well-known equi-
librium concept. In particular, Schaﬀer (1989) shows for a symmetric Cournot
duopoly with constant unit costs that the output level corresponding to the com-
petitive equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. When all ﬁrms behave competitively
and price equals marginal cost, any ﬁrm deviating from the competitive output
may strategically improve its proﬁts, but in that case the proﬁts of the competi-
tive ﬁrms will increase even more. This result was generalized by Al´ os-Ferrer and
Ania (2005) to a large class of economic games, where ﬁnite-population ESS is re-
lated to perfectly competitive behavior. Here perfectly competitive behavior refers
to aggregate-taking behavior; that is, payoﬀ maximizing behavior disregarding the
individual eﬀect on some payoﬀ-relevant aggregate.
Yet a natural question is whether the concept of ﬁnite-population ESS is some-
times related to Nash equilibrium, and whether we can say anything general about
the games where that is the case. We turn to this question in what follows.
3.1 Equivalence to Nash equilibrium in constant-sum games
We ﬁrst focus on constant-sum games; i. e. games such that
P
i πi(s) is constant for
all s. The next proposition shows that ESS and Nash equilibrium strategies coincide
in that case.
Proposition 1. Let Γ be a symmetric, constant-sum game. A strategy s is ESS if
and only if s = (s,...,s) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in Γ.
Proof. Consider the symmetric proﬁle (s,...,s) and a unilateral deviation to any
strategy s′  = s. The sum of payoﬀs before and after deviation has to be the same,












′|s, n−1 ...,s) = π(s|s, n−1 ...,s) (6)
By equation (6) the payoﬀ to s before deviation must lie between the payoﬀs to s
and s′ after deviation. If s is an ESS, then π(s|s′,s, n−2 ...,s) ≥ π(s′|s, n−1 ...,s) for all s′;
8i. e. after any deviation, the deviator to s′ must have a lower payoﬀ that those still
choosing s. Equation (6) then implies that π(s|s, n−1 ...,s) ≥ π(s′|s, n−1 ...,s) for all s′.
Thus (s,...,s) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Analogously, if (s,...,s) is a Nash
equilibrium, then π(s|s, n−1 ...,s) ≥ π(s′|s, n−1 ...,s) for all s′; i. e. the deviator to any s′
must have a lower payoﬀ than before deviation. Equation (6) then implies that, if
the payoﬀ to the deviator decreases, that of the non-deviators must increase to keep
the sum of payoﬀs constant; thus π(s|s′,s, n−2 ...,s) ≥ π(s′|s, n−1 ...,s) for all s′, so that
s is an ESS.
Intuitively, in a constant-sum game if the payoﬀs to a player decrease after a de-
viation, the opponents’ payoﬀs must increase, leaving the deviator in a worse relative
position. This shows that any strategy played at a symmetric Nash equilibrium must
be evolutionarily stable. Conversely, the payoﬀs to any player in a symmetric proﬁle
must equal the average payoﬀ across players in a non-symmetric proﬁle. Thus if a
single deviator from a symmetric proﬁle is worse oﬀ in relative terms after deviation,
this must result from a worsening in absolute terms. Therefore, any evolutionarily
stable strategy is played at a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Games with weak-payoﬀ externalities
The focus in this section is on games where the eﬀect of any unilateral deviation
on the deviator’s payoﬀ is always greater than the eﬀect on the opponents’ payoﬀs.
Formally, we say that Γ has weak-payoﬀ externalities, if for all s,s′ ∈ Sn with
s = (si,s−i), s′ = (s′
i,s−i), and si  = s′
i and for all i,j ∈ I, i  = j we have
|πi(s
′) − πi(s)| > |πj(s
′) − πj(s)|.
Proposition 2. Let Γ be a symmetric game with weak-payoﬀ externalities. A strat-
egy s is ESS if and only if s = (s,...,s) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose s is ESS but s = (s,...,s) is not a Nash equilibrium. It follows that
there exists s′  = s such that
π(s|s
′,s, n−2 ...,s) ≥ π(s
′|s, n−1 ...,s) > π(s|s, n−1 ...,s).
That is, it is proﬁtable to deviate to some s′ for some player, but payoﬀs to the
non-deviators increase at least as much, so that the deviator ends up in a worse
relative position. This obviously contradicts the fact that the game has weak-payoﬀ
externalities.
9Analogously, suppose that s = (s,...,s) is a Nash equilibrium, but s is not ESS.
It follows that there exists s′  = s such that
π(s|s, n−1 ...,s) ≥ π(s
′|s, n−1 ...,s) > π(s|s
′,s, n−2 ...,s).
That is, a deviation to s′ results in a decrease in absolute payoﬀs for the deviator,
but payoﬀs to the non-deviators decrease at least as much, so that the deviator ends
up in a better relative position. This again contradicts the property of weak-payoﬀ
externalities.
3.3 Games where imitation is improving
So far we have identiﬁed classes of games where the relation between ESS and Nash
equilibrium can be established directly. We now turn to a dynamic approach. In
this section we relate ESS and Nash equilibrium through the properties of imitative
behavioral rules of the type deﬁned in Section 2.2. In particular, we show that in
games where imitation is improving an ESS is always played in a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. We will also see later by means of an example, that the reciprocal
implication does not hold and thus there may be Nash equilibria that are not evo-
lutionarily robust. In this class of games, evolutionary stability indeed serves as a
selection criterion.
Proposition 3. Consider the decision problem modelled by the game Γ. Suppose
decision makers do not behave strategically but follow a simple behavioral rule F
corresponding to imitate the best. Assume that F is improving in Γ. If s is an ESS
of Γ, then s = (s,...,s) is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Suppose s ∈ S is an ESS and let s′ ∈ S be any other strategy. Then
π(s|s′,s, n−2 ...,s) ≥ π(s′|s, n−1 ...,s) holds by deﬁnition. Let s′ = (s′,s, n−1 ...,s) be the
resulting strategy proﬁle after a single deviation to s′ with associated vector of
payoﬀs π(s′). Let F correspond to imitate the best, then at s′ all individuals observe
x(s′) = (s′,π(s′)) and s ∈ R(x(s′)). If F is improving, then R(x(s′)) ⊆ Bi(s′) for all
i ∈ I. This implies that π(s|s, n−1 ...,s) ≥ π(s′|s, n−1 ...,s); i. e. the deviant choosing s′
obtains a weak improvement by choosing s, implying that s must correspond to a
symmetric Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Example 1. Minimum-eﬀort games
Consider the class of games where each player i ∈ I chooses an eﬀort level
si ∈ S ≡ R+. Player i’s payoﬀ is given by
πi(s1,...,sn) = a   min{s1,...,sn} − b   si + c,
10where a, b, and c are constants with a > b ≥ 0. These are referred to as minimum-
eﬀort coordination games or Stag Hunt games (see Crawford (1991)).
To see that imitation is improving note that at the proﬁle s, individuals observe
x(s) = (s,π(s)) and the reference set is R(x(s)) = {si ∈ R+|si = min{s1,...,sn}}.
Take any individual j with sj  = min{s1,...,sn}, j’s payoﬀ always improves after
imitation since
(a − b)   min{s1,...,sn} + c ≥ a   min{s1,...,sn} − b   sj + c
It is easy to see that although any level of eﬀort constitutes a symmetric Nash
equilibrium, only s = 0 is an ESS.
3.4 Discussion on supermodular and potential games
We conclude this section with a discussion on supermodular and potential games.
At ﬁrst glance, these well behaved classes of games seem good candidates that would
satisfy the kind of properties we have been looking at. It turns out that games where
imitation is improving (and thus ESS always corresponds to Nash equilibrium) are
neither a special case of, nor do they include, supermodular or potential games.
Intuitively, strategic complementarities in the case of supermodular games seem
to provide a framework where imitation should have good strategic properties. The
reason being that imitation has the eﬀect of pooling decision makers in the same
direction. Given that best response correspondences are increasing in this case (see
e. g. Vives, 1999, sec. 2.2.3), ‘moving together’ seems as the right thing to do from a
strategic perspective. However, imitation not only determines the direction in which
a mimicking decision maker moves, but makes decision makers move to exactly the
same strategy. Although it may be correct that the better reply correspondence lies
in the direction of better performers, copying the opponent strategy may take the
decision maker ‘too far’ with respect to the better reply set. An example of a super-
modular game where the ESS and the Nash equilibrium diﬀer is given by Tanaka
(2000) for the case of price competition with diﬀerentiated product. Proposition 3
above then implies that imitation can not be improving. Thus, supermodular games
are not a subclass of the games where imitation is improving. Reciprocally, it is easy
to construct examples of games which are not supermodular (not even ordinally su-
permodular) but where imitation is improving. Thus, supermodularity is unrelated
to the property of improving imitation.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that certain examples of Cournot oligopoly
are (cardinal) potential games. However, as mentioned above, ESS there corre-
sponds to competitive and not to Nash equilibrium. Proposition 3 then implies that
11imitation is not improving in Cournot oligopolies. On the other hand, the property
of improving imitation seems to be related intuitively to the ﬁnite improvement
property that characterizes generalized ordinal potential games (see Monderer and
Shapley (1996)). However, we present here an example of a game where imitation
is improving and the ﬁnite improvement property is violated. This example shows
that the class of games where imitation is improving is not a subclass of generalized
ordinal potential games.
Example 2. Consider the two-player game with payoﬀ matrix
X Y Z
X 0,0 0,0 -1,1
Y 0,0 0,0 1,-1
Z 1,-1 -1,1 0,0
It is easy to see that imitation is improving in this game.6 However, the game has
a cycle in the following improvement path
(Y,X) → (Z,X) → (Z,Z) → (Y,Z) → (Y,X);
hence, it is not a generalized ordinal potential game. This example shows that
games where imitation is improving are not a subclass of the most general class
of potential games. Additionally, given that not even the most restrictive class of
potential games (namely cardinal potential games) is a subclass of the games where
imitation is improving, we conclude that these two classes of games are unrelated.
4 Price imitation
In this section we provide an economic example of a class of n-person games where
imitate the best is always improving. Therefore, by Proposition 3 all ESS are Nash
equilibrium strategies. As we will show below, this fact is useful to ﬁnd all ESS.
4.1 The industry
Let the game Γ model an industry where identical ﬁrms I = {1,...,n} set prices
from S = [0,p]. All ﬁrms face the same cost function C(q), where q is the individual
output level. Assume that C is strictly increasing and convex and, for simplicity, that
C(0) = 0. Suppose customers buy from the ﬁrm with lowest price only and that ﬁrms
6It is also easy to check that this game is not ordinally supermodular under any reordering of
the strategies.
12adjust production to demand. Let D(p) be a strictly decreasing demand function,
which we assume strictly positive for all p ∈ [0,p]. In case of ties, demand splits
equally. Given the strategy proﬁle p = (p1,...,pn), let P(p) = min{p1,...,pn} and
M(p) = {i ∈ I | pi = P(p)}. Thus |M(p)| is the number of ﬁrms that set lowest










if i ∈ M(p)
0 if i / ∈ M(p)
and the game is obviously symmetric.
Contrary to the case of constant unit costs, where market price always equals
marginal cost in equilibrium, Dastidar (1995) shows that a symmetric Bertrand
oligopoly with homogeneous product and convex costs has a large set of pure-
strategy Nash equilibria. In order to state the set of equilibria, deﬁne for any










Let Pk ∈ R+ be such that π(Pk,k) = 0 and D(Pk) > 0; i. e. Pk is such that k active
ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. Let P ′
k ∈ R+ be such that π(P ′
k,k) = π(P ′
k,1); i. e. P ′
k is such
that each of the k active ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between sharing the market and being
a monopolist at price P ′
k. It can be shown that Pk is decreasing with k, P ′
n > P1,
and that, for any price p ∈ [Pn,P ′
n], the proﬁle where all ﬁrms set price equal to p
is a Nash equilibrium (see Dastidar, 1995, Lem. 6 and 7, and Prop. 1). Note that
at the Nash equilibrium where all ﬁrms set price Pn ﬁrms make zero proﬁts.
4.2 Price imitation is improving
We now proceed to show that copying the price of the most successful ﬁrm in the
industry can only improve the proﬁt of the imitating ﬁrm, therefore imitate the best
is improving in this game. This result provides a strategic rationale for the imitation
of competitors’ prices.
Given p, all ﬁrms observe x(p) = (p,π(p)), where π(p) is the vector of proﬁts.
Then the reference set is given by
R(x(p)) = {p ∈ [0,p] | p = pi for some i ∈ I and πi(p) ≥ πj(p)) ∀j ∈ I}.
The rule imitate the best prescribes to copy any of the prices charged by the ﬁrms
with highest proﬁts; i. e. F(x(p)) = R(x(p)) for all p.
13Proposition 4. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly with decreasing demand D(p),
increasing and convex costs C(q), and equal splitting in case of ties, R(x(p)) ⊆ Bi(p)
for all p ∈ Rn and all i ∈ I with x(p) = (p,π(p)).
Proof. For all strategy proﬁles of the type pn = (p,p, n ...,p), when all ﬁrms set the
same price, ﬁrms share the market and obtain the same proﬁts. By following imitate
the best, none of them will change the price and proﬁts cannot change after any
price revision, implying that R(x(p(n))) = {p} ⊂ Bi(p(n)) for all i ∈ I.
All other states are of the form p(m) = (p1,p2,...,pn) where 1 ≤ m < n ﬁrms
set price p and all other ﬁrms set a higher price. Without loss of generality, assume
that p1 = p2 =     = pm = p and that pi > p for i = m + 1,...,n. The proﬁts of
the ﬁrms i = m+ 1,...,n, with higher than minimum price, are πi(p(m)) = 0 while
the proﬁts of the ﬁrms i = 1,...,m, with minimum price p are given by
πi(p

















where AC(q) = C(q)/q denotes average cost and the last equality is understood to
hold only if D(p) > 0. To show that starting at p(m) imitate the best is improving,
we have to consider the following cases separately.
First, if π(p,m) > 0, then R(x(p(m))) = {p}. Convexity of C(q) implies that
that AC(q) is increasing in q.7 After strategy revision, proﬁts of idle ﬁrms do not
change and for any i = 1,...,m + 1
πi(p



















This implies that p ∈ Bi(p(m)) for all i ∈ I.
Second, if π(p,m) < 0, then R(x(p(m))) = {pm+1,...,pn}, since highest proﬁts
equal zero and are attained by idle ﬁrms. Imitation of any price in R(x(p(m)))
would not change proﬁts for idle ﬁrms i = m + 1,...,n. What happens to the














Thus, AC(q′) ≥ AC(q). If C(0) > 0 and costs are convex, then AC(q) is U-shaped, but average
variable costs are increasing. Actually, this is all we need here, although for simplicity we assumed
zero ﬁxed costs.
14proﬁts of active ﬁrms, i = 1,...,m, when any of them copies a price in R(x(p(m)))?
Obviously, if m > 1, any unilateral deviation to a price in R(x(p(m))) will yield the
deviating ﬁrm zero proﬁts, which is better than losses. Consider now the case m = 1
with π(p,1) = D(p)[p − AC(D(p))] < 0. In this case R(x(p1)) = {p2,...,pn}. Call
p′ = minR(x(p1)). If ﬁrm 1 now imitates any pi > p′, it will face no demand and














where m′ ≥ 2 is the number of ﬁrms setting price p′ after imitation. If the expression
in square brackets in equation (8) is positive, then after imitation proﬁts instead of
losses are achieved. If it is still negative, since p′ > p, the demand faced after imita-
tion is smaller (D(p′)/m′ ≤ D(p′) ≤ D(p)), thus also AC(D(p′)/m′) ≤ AC(D(p));
that is, less is sold to a lower loss per unit which results in lower total losses. In any
case, proﬁts of ﬁrm 1 after imitation will increase.
Last, if π(p,m) = 0, then R(x(p(m))) = {p1,...,pn} = C(p), since all ﬁrms
active or idle make zero proﬁts. That is, at these strategy proﬁles, imitate the best
prescribes to imitate any of the observed prices. Again we distinguish the cases
m > 1 and m = 1. Suppose m > 1, then for any i = 1,...,m imitate the best
will not change proﬁts, and for any i = m+1,...,n that imitates p the new proﬁts
will be as in equation (7) positive. Suppose m = 1, then for all i = m + 1,...,n
everything is analogous to the case m > 1, and for ﬁrm 1 everything is analogous
to the case π(p,1) < 0 considered above.
Remark 1. It is straightforward to check that the proof of Proposition 4 extends
to the case of constant unit costs; i. e. if AC(q) = c ≥ 0 for all q.
4.3 Evolutionarily stable prices
It follows from Propositions 3 and 4 that all ESS prices must correspond to Nash
equilibrium. Thus the set of ESS must be a subset of [Pn,P ′
n]. The next proposition
identiﬁes the set of prices that are evolutionarily stable.
Proposition 5. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly with decreasing demand D(p),
increasing and convex costs C(q), and equal splitting in case of ties, the set of prices
that are evolutionarily stable is the interval [Pn−1,P1].












Note ﬁrst that, starting at Pk if all k ﬁrms increase their price to p > Pk simul-
taneously, demand per ﬁrm will decrease and, by decreasing returns to scale, unit










. At the new price, proﬁts per
unit sold are now strictly positive. Since demand is positive by assumption, prof-
its will increase above zero. Analogously, if all ﬁrms simultaneously decrease their
price, proﬁts will fall below zero. I. e. for 0 < p < Pk we have π(p,k) < 0 and for
Pk < p < p we have π(p,k) > 0.
Now, for all strategy proﬁles p = (p,...,p) where all ﬁrms set p ∈ [Pn,Pn−1), if
a ﬁrm deviates upwards to any p′ > p the proﬁts of the deviator are zero because
consumers buy only at the minimum price p. Given that p < Pn−1 the remaining
n−1 ﬁrms still charging p will make losses; i. e. π(p,n−1) < 0. This means that a
single deviation to a higher price can destabilize the proﬁle where all ﬁrms set price
p, implying that p is not an ESS.
Note also that for all strategy proﬁles p = (p,...,p) where all ﬁrms set p ∈
(P1,P ′
n], if a ﬁrm deviates downwards to any P1 < p′ < p, the deviating ﬁrm, now
the one with lowest price in the market, still makes proﬁts because p′ > P1, while all
competitors make zero proﬁts; i. e. π(p′,1) > 0. This means that a single deviation
to a lower price can destabilize p, and thus p is not an ESS.
It remains to check that all prices p ∈ [Pn−1,P1] are ESS. Consider any symmetric
proﬁle p = (p,...,p) with p ∈ [Pn−1,P1]. Note that any deviant setting price
p′ > p earns zero proﬁts while non-deviants get π(p,n − 1) ≥ 0 since p ≥ Pn−1.
Alternatively, any deviant with price p′ < p obtains π(p′,1) < 0 since p′ < P1, while
non-deviants earn zero proﬁts.
Proposition 5 shows that only a strict subset of Nash equilibrium prices are
evolutionarily stable. In particular neither very low prices like Pn not very high
prices in that interval, like P ′
n, are robust to single deviations. If the market price is
lower than Pn−1, the proﬁt margin is so small that any ﬁrm that would experiment
with a higher price would leave competitors with losses. If the market price is higher
than P1, a monopoly would be proﬁtable at that and slightly lower prices, thus any
ﬁrm that would experiment with a slightly lower price would make proﬁts and leave
competitors with zero proﬁts. If relative performance is relevant to ﬁrms we can rule
out some of the Nash equilibria; in particular those equilibria with zero or low proﬁts.
In a dynamic setting with ﬁrms that imitate the price of the best-performing ﬁrms
16in the industry and sporadically experiment with unobserved prices, Al´ os-Ferrer et
al. (2000) show that precisely the prices in the interval [Pn−1,P1] are the long-run
prices observed in a Bertrand oligopoly with homogeneous product and decreasing
returns to scale. As we see here, the fact that all prices in the interval [Pn−1,P1] are
ESS underlies their dynamics results, since none of these prices can be destabilized
with a single mutation.
the fact that these prices are evolutionarily stable is crucial for their result, since
single deviations to other prices are not enough to destabilize proﬁles where all ﬁrms
set the same price in that interval.
Example 3. Consider a symmetric duopoly with demand function D(p) = 10 − p
and cost function C(q) =
1
2q2. Any proﬁle where both ﬁrms set the same price in
[P2,P ′
2] with P2 = 2 and P ′
2 = 4.285 is a Nash equilibrium. The only price which
is evolutionarily stable is P1 = 3.33, which entails strictly positive proﬁts for both
ﬁrms and turns out to be the competitive equilibrium also.
Remark 2. Note that if unit costs are constant, i. e. if AC(q) = c ≥ 0 for all q,
then Pk = c for all k. Thus, the only ESS is p = c.
4.4 Industry proﬁts
The results obtained so far focus on proﬁts to individual ﬁrms. We turn our focus
now to industry proﬁts. We show that when all ﬁrms follow imitate the best si-
multaneously, average payoﬀ in the industry does not necessarily increase, although
individual payoﬀ always increases. Interestingly, we will argue at the end of the
section that some imitative rules could even have both properties, always improving
individual and average industry payoﬀ.
Following the notation introduced previously in this section, at any strategy
proﬁle p(m), average industry proﬁts are given by
π(p
(m)) =












Note ﬁrst that, if π(p,m) > 0, then R(x(p(m))) = {p}. Thus, if all ﬁrms follow



















That is, from any strategy proﬁle where all active ﬁrms in the industry obtain strictly
positive proﬁts, imitate the best will increase average payoﬀ in the industry.
17To see that average industry payoﬀ may decrease when all ﬁrms imitate the prices
of the best performing ﬁrms consider the following example. Take I = {1,...,4}
and consider the strategy proﬁle p(2) = (p,p,p′,p′′) with p < p′ = p + ǫ < p′′ for










< 0; i such that pi = p
Then π(p(2)) = 1
2π(p,2) < 0
Now it could happen that ﬁrms with maximum proﬁts (choosing p′ and p′′ in
our example) do not change their price and ﬁrms with lower than maximum proﬁts
(currently choosing p) copy the highest price observed, p′′. The resulting strategy
proﬁle after imitation would be of the type p′(1) = (p′,p′′,p′′,p′′). After imitation,
the proﬁt of the ﬁrm with price p′ will be given by
π(p
′,1) = D(p + ǫ)[p + ǫ − AC (D(p + ǫ))]











That is, in an industry where the current active ﬁrms make losses, copying the
price set by ﬁrms which are not active, which can be interpreted as exiting the
industry, leaves the industry with fewer active ﬁrms. Decreasing returns to scale
imply that proﬁts can be even lower, and thus average industry proﬁts may decrease.
Consider instead a further speciﬁcation of the imitative rule used so far, assuming
that ﬁrms copy only the lowest price among those that gave maximum payoﬀs. This
rule is plausible if we believe that ﬁrms understand at least the broad structure of
the game they are playing, even if they do not know the demand and cost functions
exactly. We refer to this rule as imitate the minimum best and it is formally deﬁned
as follows. Given x = (p,u), F(x) = minR(x). As the following proposition shows,
this rule has both properties; it increases individual as well as average industry
proﬁts.
Proposition 6. In a symmetric Bertrand game with decreasing demand D(p), in-
creasing and convex costs C(q), and equal splitting in case of ties, imitate the min-
imum best is improving; i. e. minR(x(p)) ⊆ Bi(p) for all p ∈ Rn and all i ∈ I
with x(p) = (p,π(p)). Moreover, when all ﬁrms use imitate the minimum best
simultaneously, average industry proﬁts always increase.
8Take for example D(p) = 12 − 2p, C(q) = q2, and p(2) = (2,2,2.5,3).
18Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition is a straightforward corollary from Proposi-
tion 4. To see that, when all ﬁrms follow the rule, it also increases average industry
payoﬀs deﬁne let p(m) be a state of the type deﬁned above, where 1 ≤ m < n ﬁrms
set price p and all other ﬁrms set higher prices. Note ﬁrst that, at states where
all active ﬁrms have strictly positive proﬁts minR(x(p)) = R(x(p)) = {p}, and
at states where active ﬁrms obtain exactly zero proﬁts R(x(p)) = {p1,...,pn} and
minR(x(p)) = {p} also. By (10) in all those states average payoﬀ increases when
all ﬁrms copy p. At states where active ﬁrms make losses, the reference set is given
by R(x(p(m))) = {pm+1,...,pn}. Let p′ = min{pm+1,...,pn}. If all ﬁrms copy p′,







































The ﬁrst inequality holds because D(p′) < D(p) and π(p(m)) < 0. The second
inequality holds because p′ > p and AC is increasing.
5 Conclusions
Evolutionary game theory emphasizes the role of relative performance in determin-
ing the outcomes that we should expect to observe in games. In the framework
of a continuum population, developed and extensively applied in Biology, the no-
tion of evolutionary stability provides a stability check for Nash equilibrium. The
application of evolutionary principles to ﬁnite-population models has shown some
surprising eﬀects. In particular, high relative performance is often in accordance
with perfectly competitive behavior, and not necessarily with the strategic behavior
inherent to Nash equilibrium.
The present paper explores the relation between ﬁnite-population evolutionary
stability and Nash equilibrium. First, we show that ESS and symmetric Nash equi-
librium strategies coincide in zero-sum games and in what we call games with weak
payoﬀ externalities. Then we point out that in some games (e. g. minimum-eﬀort
games) imitate the best is improving, meaning that individuals who copy the best-
performing among the observed actions can only improve their payoﬀs. If that is the
case, imitate the best is strategically justiﬁed and gives rise to a dynamics related
to the better-reply dynamics. We then show that in these kind of games ﬁnite-
population evolutionarily stable strategies always correspond to Nash equilibrium
strategies, but not vice-versa.
19We illustrate these properties in the context of a Bertrand oligopoly with homo-
geneous product and decreasing returns to scale. There, we show that price imitation
is always individually improving; a ﬁrm that mimics the price of the best performing
competitor can only improve its proﬁts. This, in turn, implies that all evolutionarily
stable prices are Nash equilibrium prices. This result allows easy identiﬁcation of
the set of evolutionarily stable prices. Moreover, we ﬁnd that not all Nash equilibria
are evolutionarily stable. Suﬃciently low prices, that can be part of a Nash equi-
librium, can easily lead to losses, if a boundedly rational ﬁrm experiments with a
higher price. Analogously, suﬃciently high Nash equilibrium prices leave room for
an individual ﬁrm to dominate the market at a slightly lower price. Even if these
deviations imply a reduction of the deviator’s proﬁts by deﬁnition, they have an
even stronger negative eﬀect on competitors and result in a relative advantage.
Note ﬁnally that the evolutionarily stable prices characterized here would also
be the prediction of a model where ﬁrms care for both, absolute and relative per-
formance, as in Ko¸ ckesen et al. (2000). Given that evolutionarily stable strategies
are Nash equilibria, any deviation would be associated with a worse absolute and
relative position. Therefore, this set of prices is extremely robust.
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